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DECEMBER 23,1985: A TURNING POINT IN THE GRANTING
OF FARM SUBSIDIES UNDER THE FOOD SECURITY ACT OF
1985
Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has long been recognized as one of the leading
agricultural producers. In fact, a small number of U.S. farmers are
responsible for feeding the growing nation. As the number of farmers in
the nation declined, the government recognized that it needed to help
farmers financially.
To aid the nation's farmers, Congress passed the Food Security
Act of 1985 ("FSA").2 This bill provided subsidies to farmers who grew
particular crops.3 At the same time, Congress recognized that it needed to
take measures to preserve the environment.4 In order to balance the two
interests, Congress promulgated that farmers who converted wetlands into
farms would be denied subsidy benefits.5 However, in 1996 Congress
amended the FSA to provide an exception.6 The amendment stated that a
farmer could reconvert a previously converted wetland if the
reclassification to a wetland was due to a lack of maintenance to a
drainage system.' In enacting this provision, Congress was unclear about
how to determine whether land constituted a previously converted
wetland. That determination has been left for the courts to decide.
' 397 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005).
2 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat 1354 (1985) (hereinafter "FSA"); see
H.R. REP. No. 99-271, at 8 (1985).
3 H.R. REP. No. 99-271, at 1-4.
4 H.R. REP. No. 99-27 1, at 86-87.
s H.R. REP. No. 99-271, at 88.
6 Federal Agriculture Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, § 322, 110 Stat. 888, 987-89
(1996) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3822(b)(1)(G)(i)-(iii) (2000)).
Id.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Horn Farms, Inc. ("Horn"), owned by Gene Horn, consists of
approximately 1400 acres of land in Fulton and Cass Counties in Indiana.8
Between February of 1995 and February of 1996, Horn purchased 150
acres of land situated in Fulton County.9 Of the 150 acres, a 6.2 acre
parcel is at issue in this case.10
Prior to Horn's purchase, a previous owner had installed a drainage
tile system on the 6.2 acre parcel." The tile system began to fall into
disrepair during the late 1970's but was never replaced or repaired.12 In
1998, Horn cleared trees and vegetation on the parcel in efforts to repair
the tile system.'3  Horn determined that a prior owner had previously
farmed the property, but because of the tile system's disrepair, he
concluded that a prior owner had converted the land back to a wetland.14
Horn decided to drain the 6.2 acres and use it for farming.
After Horn repaired the tiling system, the National Resources and
Conservation Services ("NRCS") conducted a site assessment of the
parcel.'6  In May of 1999, NRCS notified Horn that his land was in
violation of the "Swampbuster" statute.'7  The notice stated that Horn
could mediate his claims with NRCS, which Horn chose to do.'8 During
8 Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 3, Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472 (7th Cir.
2005) (No. 04-1502) (hereinafter "Brief in Opposition").
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005)
(No. 04-1502) (hereinafter "Petition for Cert.").
10 Id. at 5-6.
" Id. at 5.
12 id.
13 Brief in Opposition, supra note 8, at 3.
14 id
" Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 474.
16 Id. The NRCS is a division of the United States Department of Agriculture. One of its
responsibilities is to determine the application of the statutes as they apply to parcels of land; it was
responsible for interpreting the statute at issue in this case. See 7 C.F.R. § 12.5(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (2005).
17 Petition for Cert., supra note 9, at 5. The Swampbuster statute states in part that,
No person shall become ineligible under section 3821 of this title for program
loans or payments under the following circumstances: (1) As the result of the
production of an agricultural commodity on the following lands: (A) converted
wetland if the conversion of the wetland was commenced before December 23,
1985.
16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(A) (2005).
18 Petition for Cert., supra note 9, at 5.
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the mediation, NRCS gave Horn the option of restoring the 6.2 acres to
wetland or mitigating the loss of the wetlands by acquiring, developing, or
restoring approximately 32 acres of wetlands on another parcel of land.19
Horn refused to acquire, develop, or restore any land.20 Thus, because the
parties could not agree on an adequate remedy, 21 Horn lost all farm
subsidies beginning in 1999.22
The Swampbuster statute provides for lawful conversion of a
wetland, "if the original conversion of the wetland was commenced before
December 23, 1985" and if the Secretary of the Conservation department
determines that "the wetland characteristics returned after that date as a
result of - the lack of maintenance of drainage . . . a lack of management
of the lands ... or circumstances beyond the control of the person. 23 The
interpretation of "after that date" is at issue in this case.24 Horn claimed
that the phrase referred to the date of the original conversion of the
wetland, while the Respondents claimed that the phrase referred to the
date of the enactment of the Act, which is December 23, 1985.25
The district court determined that the phrase "after that date" was
ambiguous. 26 After the district court reviewed the legislative history and
the purpose of the exemption, it concluded that "after that date" referred to
the date of the original conversion of the wetlands.27 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed with this reasoning and overturned the district court's decision.28
The Seventh Circuit stated that the phrase "after that date" could not refer
to the original date of the conversion because there was no standard for
identifying wetlands prior to December 23, 1985, or the date the statute
19 Id. at 5-6. The Swampbuster statute allows for a person to mitigate their damages by turning
other land into wetlands, thus allowing the person to remain eligible for federal farm subsidies. 16
U.S.C. §3822(f)(2).
20 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 474.
21 id.
22 Petition for Cert., supra note 9, at 6. The mediation lasted through 2001. Id. However, Horn's
subsidies were stopped in the year Horn allegedly violated the statute. Id. As of October 1, 2003,
Horn had lost over $150,000 in farm subsidies as a result of the conversion. Id. at 8.
23 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(G)(i)-(iii).
24 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 474.
25 Petition for Cert., supra note 9, at 7.
26 Id. at 7-8.
27 Id. at 8.
28 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 479.
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was enacted.29
In the district court, Horn claimed that Congress was misusing its
spending power by making receipt of farm subsidies contingent upon
preserving wetlands.30 The court responded by stating, "the Swampbuster
provisions are coercive, in fact, they give the USDA a big club with which
to protect wetlands." 3' However, the district court did not hold the statute
unconstitutional.32 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of
Congress' spending authority.3 3 The court stated that if it were "coercive"
to link a subsidy to the farmer's use of the land, it would also be
"coercive" to link a subsidy to the type of agricultural product produced
on the land.34
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Historically, wetlands were not considered an important resource. 35
Only recently has the public viewed wetlands as an important part of the
environment.36  The passing of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
marked the shift in attitude towards wetlands.37  This Act prohibited the
creation of any man-made obstruction on a navigable waterway without
the consent of Congress. 38  The Act also prohibited the filling of any
waterway without the authorization of the Secretary of the Army.39
However, the Act did not specifically use the word "cwetland."40
Congress did not directly protect wetlands until 1934, when it
passed the Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act ("Stamp
29 Id. at 475.
30 Id. at 474. Horn claimed the statute was unconstitutional because it conditioned the receipt of
funds so that the recipient had no practical alternative other than complying with the federal
directive. Petition for Cert., supra note 8-9; See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
31 Petition for Cert., supra note 9.
32 id
3 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 477.
34 id.
3s Daryn McBeth, Wetlands Conservation and Federal Regulation: Analysis of the Food Security
Act's "Swampbuster" Provisions as Amended by the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform
Act of 1996, 21 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 201, 214-15 (1997).
36 Id. at 215.
n Id. See 33 U.S.C. § 402 (2005).
38 McBeth, supra note 33, at 215.
39 Id. at 216.
40 id.
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Act").4 1 The Stamp Act required duck hunters to purchase "duck
stamps."42 The proceeds of the program went towards purchasing and
protecting wetlands.43
Today there are two major laws directly aimed at protecting
wetlands: § 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA")" and the Wetland
Conservation provision of the FSA (i.e., the "Swampbuster" Act).45
Generally, the CWA prohibits the dredging or filling of wetlands.46
However, the CWA provides an exception to this general rule for the
discharge of farm materials.47 Congress responded to this exception by
passing the Food Security Act of 1985.48 Under this Act, a farmer cannot
drain or fill a wetland in order to use the land for agricultural production.49
A. Regulation of Wetlands under the FSA of 1985
In 1985, Congress passed the FSA to help strike a balance between
providing the nation with its food supply and preserving the
environment.50 The bill was passed at a time when the nation's economy
was putting a "grim squeeze" on farmers. 5' At the time, a world-wide
recession had decreased the market for agricultural products, while the
weakening dollar was driving many American farmers out of business. 52
Congress balanced the need to help farmers financially against the nation's
interest in preserving the environmental benefits provided by wetlands. 53
Congress noted that there was a need to reduce the rapid rate at which
41 Id. See 16 U.S.C. §718 (2005).
42 McBeth, supra note 32, at 216.
43 id.
4 Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 56 Stat. 884 (1972).
45 McBeth, supra note 32, at 217.
46 Id. at 218-19.
47 Id. at 219. The Act allows "discharge of dredged or fill material" resulting "from normal
farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage,
harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water
conservation practices." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2005).
48 McBeth, supra note 32, at 219. See FSA, supra note 2.
49 Id. at 220-21.
'o H.R. REP. NO. 99-271, at 88.
' Id. at 8.
52 Id. at 8-9.
53 Id. at 86. For example, "[w]etlands provide excellent habit for waterfowl, fish, and other
wildlife by providing critical foot, nesting and breeding areas." Id.
175
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landowners were converting wetlands for agricultural use, since farmers
could 5produce a surplus with the current amount of land available to
them. Congress balanced these two interests by denying subsidies to any
farmer who converted wetlands for agricultural use after December 23,
1985, the date that Congress enacted the Swampbuster statute.55
When enacting this statute, the legislature created an exemption for
previously converted wetlands. 56 The legislative debate indicated that all
previously converted wetlands would be grandfathered in under the
statute.57  This meant that farmers could reconvert any wetland that had
previously been used for agricultural purposes back to agricultural use
without a penalty.58
In 1990, Congress amended the FSA by adding language to
incorporate the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act. 5 9  The
amendment retained most of the language of the 1985 Act, however, the
amended FSA made it easier for the government to declare a farmer
ineligible for subsidies. 60 The amendment increased the time in which a
farmer could be charged with a violation of the Swampbuster provision
and lose his or her agricultural subsidies.6 ' Farmers no longer have to
produce an agricultural commodity on the converted land to violate the
Act.62 Rather, farmers violate the Act by engaging in any activity that
detracts from the land's wetland characteristics.63 The amendment did not
54 Id. at 87. Congress cited the National Wetlands Trends Study, which was conducted by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Services. Id. The study found that "less than 50 percent - - of the original 215
million acres" of wetland remain. Id.
s5 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-22.
56 H.R. REP. No. 99-27 1, at 283.
57 Id. at 419.
5 See id. See also, Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 476.
5 Food, Agriculture, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359 (1990) (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 1421 (2005)).
6 Id. at 3572. The amendment added the language,
[Any person who in any crop year subsequent to [November 28, 1990]
converts a wetland by draining, dredging, filling, leveling, or any other means
for the purpose, or to have the effect, of making the production of an
agriculture commodity possible on such converted wetland shall be ineligible
for the payments, loans, or programs [under the farm subsidies provisions
located in 16 U.S.C. §3821].
Id.
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change the provision allowing a farmer to remain eligible for subsidies as
long as the conversion of the wetland began before December 23, 1985. 4
Congress amended the Swampbuster Act again in 1996.65 The
1996 amendment stated that a farmer would not lose his or her eligibility
for subsidies if the farmer produced agricultural goods on
[a] converted wetland if the original conversion of the
wetland was commenced before December 23, 1985, and
the Secretary determines the wetland characteristics
returned after that date as a result of - (i) the lack of
maintenance of drainage . . . (ii) a lack of management . .
.or (iii) circumstances beyond the control of the person.66
This amendment provided an exception to the conversion of wetlands.
Congress left the control and implementation of the Swampbuster
provisions in the hands of the United States Department of Agriculture
("USDA").67  Specifically, the Farm Service Agency and the NRCS are
responsible for enforcing the Swampbuster provisions. 68 A farmer seeking
subsidies under the FSA must first ask the local division of the NRCS to
determine whether his or her property contains wetlands. 69  After the
NRCS makes its determination, the Farm Service Agency determines
whether the farmer is eligible for USDA subsidies. 70 The farmer is able to
appeal the decision in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Code
of Federal Regulations ("CFR").n Once the farmer has exhausted his or
her administrative appeals, he or she may turn to the judicial system for
64 Id. See Food, Agriculture, and Trade Act of 1990, supra note 60.
65 See Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat.
888 (1996).
6 Id. at 988-89.
6 7 C.F.R. § 12.1 (2006). See 16 U.S.C. § 3822(a) (stating that the Secretary of Agriculture is
responsible for implementation of the statute). The Secretary of Agriculture published regulations
for implementing "Swampbuster" in 1987. Anthony N. Turrini, Swampbuster: A Report From the
Front, 24 IND. L. REv. 1507, 1508 (1991).
68 7 C.F.R § 12.6. The Farm Service Agency and NRCS are both USDA agencies.
69 United States v. Dierckman, 41 F.Supp.2d 870, 872 (S.D. Ind. 1998). See also 7 C.F.R. §
12.6(c)(2)(i). In 1994, the Soil Conservation Service changed its name to the National Resource
and Conservation Service due to the agency's reorganization. Douglas Helms, Natural Resources
Conservation Service BrieffHistory, Natural Resources Conservation Service,
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/about/history/articles/briefhistory.html.
70 Dierckman, 41 F.Supp.2d at 872. See also 7 C.F.R. § 12.6 (b)(3)(i)-(xi).
' 7 C.F.R. § 12.12; see 7 C.F.R. §§ 11.1-11.15 (2005); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-06 (2005).
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further redress.72
The judicial system has used both the statutory language of the
Swampbuster provision and the Secretary of Agriculture's interpretation
of the statute to decide the cases before it.73  In most cases, the
determination of the agency will be upheld because the administrative
decision need only be supported by a "rational basis." 74 The examining
court need only determine that "the agency examined the relevant data and
articulated a satisfactory explanation of its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." 75 Because of
this standard, the judicial system has not closely examined the specific
provision of either the FSA of 1985 or the provisions in the CFR.
However, the judicial system made important decisions under the
FSA of 1985. In Citizens for Honesty and Integrity in Regional Planning
v. County of San Diego,76 the Southern District of California was asked to
determine whether the federal regulation of wetlands preempted state laws
governing wetlands.77 The court determined that when Congress enacted
the FSA, it left room for states to make their own regulations regarding
wetlands. Thus a state was free to enact a stricter definition of
"wetlands" and could take a more forceful approach in slowing the
conversion of these lands.79
B. Spending Clause of the United States Constitution
The drafters of the Constitution provided that "Congress shall have
72 Justin Lamunyon, Wetlands and the Swampbuster Provisions: the Delineations Procedures,
Options, andAlternatives for the American Farmer, 73 NEB. L. REv. 163, 175 (1994); see 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559 (2005).
n See Prokop v. United States, 91 F.Supp.2d 1301 (D. Neb. 2000); Downer v. U.S. Dept. of
Agric., 894 F.Supp. 1348 (D. S.D. 1995); Barthel v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 181 F.3d 934 (8th Cir.
1999).
74 Diercknan, 41 F.Supp.2d at 875. Additionally, the standard of review is narrow and is limited
to decisions that were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law." Id. at 874-75 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
7 Id. at 875 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
76 258 F.Supp.2d 1132 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
7 Id. at 1135.
7 Id. at 1135-38.
7 Id. at 1139.
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Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence [sic] and general welfare of
the United States . . . ."so Since the drafting of this provision, scholars
have debated the scope of Congress' spending power.8 ' Some scholars
contend the clause only concerns spending for enumerated powers.82
Others believe the spending power confers a power separate and distinct
from the other enumerated powers listed in the Constitution, a power
which Congress can exercise for the general welfare of the nation.83
In 1996, the Supreme Court provided the first definition of
Congress' spending power in United States v. Butler.84 In Butler, several
farmers challenged the constitutionality of the Agriculture Adjustment Act
of 1933.5 The Act provided for a tax on the processing of certain
commodities. 86 The tax was then used to provide subsidies to farmers
who produced a small amount of commodities. In analyzing the Act, the
Court held that Congress' power to spend was limited to acts within the
pursuit of the general welfare. For that reason, the express provisions
stated in Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution limited
Congress' spending power.8 9  Under this analysis, Congress has very
broad spending power, yet the Court said there was no power to tax the
commodities.90 The Court reasoned that the regulation of agriculture was
not a power specifically granted to Congress under the Tenth Amendment,
and as such, it fell within the exclusive control of the states. 9
Using the "general welfare" analysis, the Court has upheld
Congress' spending power in a variety of situations. 92 Even though the
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
81 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
82 id
83 id
" Id. at 66.
85 Id. at 53; see 7 U.S.C. § 601 (2005).
86 Id. at 55.
87 Id. at 58-59.
8 Id. at 65-66.
89 Id. at 66.
9 See id. at 68.
91 Id.
92 See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding Congress' power to enact the
Social Security Act); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (stating that the legislation is
responsible for defining "general welfare").
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Court has not taken many steps to limit Congress' spending power, it has
broadened the definition to encompass spending that has the effect of
encouraging states to adopt certain policies.93 Congress can now use its
spending power to grant funds to states that adopt certain laws.94 As such,
Congress has influenced state laws in areas such as social security, racial
desegregation, pollution, education, and highway construction. 95
The Court evidenced its support for this type of Congressional
influence in South Dakota v. Dole.96  In this case, South Dakota
challenged Congress' ability to condition highway funding on the states'
adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one years. 97 The Court
stated that the powers enumerated in the Spending Clause allowed
Congress to attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.9 8  These
conditions could be used to further broad policy objectives. 99
The Court reiterated that although the spending power of Congress
was broad, it still had its limits.'00 The Court specifically mentioned four
limitations on Congress' spending power.' 0 In order to be an acceptable
exercise of power, (i) the provision must be in the pursuit of "the general
welfare," (ii) the use of funds must be conditioned unambiguously, (iii)
the use of funds must relate to a legitimate federal interest, and (iv) must
not violate another constitutional provision.102 In order to determine
whether the legislation fits into category (i), a court should substantially
defer to the legislature.' 03 The Court further stated that in order to be in
compliance with provision (ii) the state must be aware of the condition
placed on the receipt of funds and recognize the consequences of its
9 Patrick R. Douglas, Conservation or Coercion: Federal Regulation ofIntrastate Wetlands under




96 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
97 Id. at 205.
98 Id. at 206.
9 Id.
'* Id. at 207.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 207-08. Some courts have also claimed that Dole includes a fifth provision: financial
incentives offered by Congress cannot be so significant that they amount to coercion. Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2005).
303 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
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participation. 104 Under this analysis, the court upheld the conditioning of
funding on requiring the state drinking age to be twenty-one. 0 5
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted and applied the exception found in the 1996 amendment to the
Swampbuster statute. The exception provides that no person will
become ineligible for subsidies for converting a wetland, where the
original conversion of the wetland was commenced before December 23,
1985, and the wetland characteristics returned after "that date" as a result
of lack of maintenance of a drainage system, lack of management, or
circumstances beyond the control of the person.107 The court focused on
the statutory interpretation of the phrase "that date."' 0 8
The court first addressed whether the district court's decision
amounted to a final judgment.109 The district court remanded the issue to
the Secretary of Agriculture; however, it did not expressly state what
action the Secretary should to take.110 Because the district court remanded
the case without ordering a concrete remedy, the decision was "non-final,"
which made an appeal inappropriate."' However, the court reasoned that
the Secretary could not take any action that would lead to a new
administrative order that the government could take back to district
court.112 Thus, the district court's decision was final and appealable. 113
The court then addressed whether the phrase "that date" applied to
the date of the original conversion or to how the land was classified on
10 Id. See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
10 Id. at 203.
116 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 474. The 1996 amendment allows a farmer to reconvert wetland for
agricultural purposes if the wetland had previously been identified as converted wetland (if the
original conversion was commenced before December 23, 1985), but the land had reverted to
wetland status after that date as a result of lack of maintenance of drainage. 16 U.S.C. §
3822(b)(2)(D).
107 Id. § 3822(b)(1)(G).
"o Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 474.
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December 23, 1985.114 The court ultimately held "that date" referred to
the land's classification as of December 23, 1985.i"s The court relied on
four contextual elements to support its conclusion. 116 "First, December
23, 1985, is the last antecedent of 'that date.""' 7 Second, the phrase "after
that date" could not refer to the original date of the conversion because
there was no approach for identifying wetlands prior to December 23,
1985.118 Third, if the date of the original conversion were used, then most
of the remaining statutory language would be meaningless." 9 Lastly,
"when 'that date' is understood to be December 23, 1985, the subsection is
a non-degradation clause . . . ."'20 The court explained that reading the
subsection as a non-degradation clause was consistent with legislative
intent because it would protect wetlands as they existed on the date of the
statute's enactment. 121  Further, if "that date" referred to the date of
original conversion, then the statute would be hard to police because
landowners could claim that the land had previously been converted so
long ago that it would be hard to determine the accuracy of their claims.122
The court also relied on precedent in determining the meaning of
"that date." 23  The court looked to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 24 to determine how much weight the
court should give to the Secretary's interpretation of the phrase. 25 Under
the Chevron analysis, if a statutory phrase is ambiguous, the agency's
interpretation prevails over competin interpretations (so long as the
agency's interpretation is reasonable). 6 Therefore under the Chevron
analysis, the agency's interpretation in this case trumps Congressional
114 Id. at 475-76. December 23, 1985 is the date the original Swampbuster provision was enacted.
Id.
115 Id. at 476.






122 Id. at 475-76.
123 Id. at 476.
124 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
125 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 476.
126 id.
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intent. 127
The court next addressed whether the Swampbuster provision was
unconstitutional because it violated the Spending Clause and amounted to
impermissible coercion. 128 The court first stated that Horn's argument
was invalid because Horn was not a governmental body.129 As such, it
lacked any sovereignty that could be "trampled upon."' 30  The court
further reasoned that if it were "coercive" to link a subsidy to land use, it
would be "coercive" to condition the subsidy on the particular type of
agricultural product grown.131 The court stated that if this logic were
applied, it would demolish the entire system of agricultural subsidies.132
Further, the court reiterated that a statute does not violate
Congress' spending power if it: "(i) promote[s] the general welfare, (ii)
[is] unambiguous (at least when [the provisions] affect states), and (iii)
relate[s] to a legitimate federal interest."l 33 Applying these principles, the
court determined that the Swampbuster provision helped preserve
wetlands, which made it a legitimate federal interest and promoted the
general welfare.134 In terms of the second interest, the court held the
statute to be straightforward.135 The court did not find the statute to be a
violation of spending power. 136
Finally, the court considered whether the Swampbuster provisions
offended the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 37 The district
court held that the review process did not provide a farmer an adequate
opportunity for administrative review. 138 However, the appellate court
stated that the lower court should not have entertained a constitutional
challenge to the statute "when challenges to statutes' validity should be




130 Id. at 476 -77. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 1.
13 Id. at 477.
132 id.
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determined "that date" referred to December 23, 1985, there would have
been no other material facts Horn could have contested upon
administrative appeal.140 Therefore, the court held that there was no due
process claim allowing the issue to pass without further analysis.14 1
V. COMMENT
A. The Seventh Circuit's Interpretation of "That Date"
Congress enacted the FSA of 1985 to help balance the nation's
need for an increasing food supply with the need to stop the disappearance
of wetlands.142 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Horn Farms ignores the
importance of the agricultural industry and the farmers' need to use the
land in its previously converted state. The legislature considered these
competing interests when it enacted the FSA by including a provision that
grandfathered in previously converted wetlands. 143  Additionally, the
Eighth Circuit has successfully balanced these interests, by determining
that land farmers can maintain the land as it was prior to the date of the
Act.144 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit should have upheld the district
court's decision, which declared that the phrase "that date" referred to the
original date of conversion.
In deciding Horn Farms, the Seventh Circuit applied the Chevron
analysis in stating that if a portion of a statute is ambiguous, the agency's
interpretation will prevail over any legislative intent. 145 However, the
court misapplied the holding of Chevron. Chevron states that an agency's
interpretation of a statute should not always be the first step in statutory
construction.146 In Chevron, the Supreme Court stated that the judiciary
should be "the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent."1 47
140 Id at 478.
141 id.
142 See H.R. REP. No. 99-271, at 8.
143 Id. at 416,419.
'" Barthel, 181 F.3d at 936.
145 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 476.
'" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
147 Id. at 843 n.9.
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When Congress enacted the FSA, the sponsors indicated a clear
intent to "grandfather" in previously converted wetlands.14 8 The bill's
sponsor stated that if cropland has been flooded and later reclaimed it
would not affect the land's classification.149 If production had occurred at
anytime in the past, then the land would be grandfathered in under the
Act.'50
Congress clearly indicated its intent to protect previously
converted land under the Act. However, the court indicated that because
this language referred to the original enactment of the bill, it had nothing
to do with the amendment at issue in this case.151 This view ignores the
fact that Congress is forward thinking and looks to the future when it
writes a bill. In enacting the FSA, Congress wanted all land that had been
used for production at any point in the past to be free for agricultural use
in the future. Therefore, congressional intent should trump the agencies'
interpretation, and "that date" should refer to the original date of
conversion.
The Seventh Circuit is not the only court that has interpreted
whether land converted before 1985 could be re-converted. The Eighth
Circuit was presented with a similar issue in Gunn v. US. Department of
Agriculture.152 In Gunn, the landowner's predecessors had farmed the
land since 1906.153 During that year a tiling system was installed to drain
the land.154 By 1947, the amount of water in some areas exceeded the
capacity of the tiling system, leaving some of the land wet and unsuitable
155 156for farming.' These wet areas existed in 1985. In 1992, a new tiling
system was installed, increasing drainage so that the wet areas no longer
existed.157 The reviewing agency determined that Gunn's land contained
converted wetlands because of the drainage.' 58  Thus, Gunn lost his
148 See H.R. REP. No. 99-271, at 416, 419.
149 Id. at 419.
150 Id
5 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 476.
152 118 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 1997).





18 Id. at 1236.
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eligibility for farm subsidies.159
Even though the court in Gunn relied upon 16 U.S.C. §
3821 (b)(1)(A) and not 16 U.S.C. § 3822, which is at issue in Horn Farms,
the court's opinion indicates that it would support Horn's argument.' 60 In
determining whether to reinstate Gunn's subsidies, the Eighth Circuit
stated that the Swampbuster provision provided an exception for
previously converted wetlands.' 6 ' The court then stated that the farming
of previously converted wetlands does not make a farmer ineligible for
subsidies.162 Furthermore, "the land became 'converted wetland' before
December 23, 1985, and remains in that classification forever, whatever
may have happened later." 63  These statements evidence the Eighth
Circuit's support for Horn's argument. Horn's land was once converted,
and as such, will always remain classified as a converted wetland.
In fact, the Northern District of Iowa interpreted these statements
to allow a farmer to repair a tiling system that had fallen into disrepair,
when the wetland characteristics had returned to the land before December
23, 1985.'6" In Branstad v. Glickman, a tiling system was installed on the
land sometime in the early 1900's.165 The tiling system fell into disrepair,
and by 1987, the USDA classified the land as "wetlands."' 66  The
Branstads purchased the land in 1995 and shortly thereafter sought
permission from the USDA to repair the tiling system.167  The USDA
granted permission for the repairs. 6 8 After the Branstads completed the
repairs in 1997, the USDA inspected the land.169  Based upon this
inspection, the USDA commenced proceedings against the Branstads for
159 Id.
I6 Id. at 1235-40. In Gunn, the farmer argued that he had the right to manipulate a drainage
system that was already in place while the Department of Agriculture claimed that he had to
maintain the system at the December 23, 1985 level, thus he could not improve the system. Id.
The court stated that he had a right to continue to farm the land; however, the new tiling system
could not provide more drainage than the original system. Id.
161 Id. at 1235.
162 id
163 Id. at 1238.
16' See Branstad v. Glickman, 118 F.Supp.2d 925, 941 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
' Id. at 928.
167 id
16 Id.
169 Id. at 928-29.
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"converting" wetlands.' 70
Even though Branstad involved a farmer's ability to manipulate a
drainage system that was already in place, the situation is almost identical
to Horn Farms. In both instances, the farmers sought to repair existing
drainage systems on land that had been reclassified as wetlands.
However, the court in Branstad reached a different conclusion regarding
the farmers' ability to repair the tile system.17' The court stated that if a
wetland had been converted before December 23, 1985, the land could
continue to be farmed as long any repairs to a drainage system did not
exceed the drainage system's original scope.' 72 Both Eighth Circuit cases
signify that the Seventh Circuit should have interpreted "that date" to
mean the date of original conversion and that it should have upheld the
district court's decision.
B. The Seventh Circuit's Analysis under the Spending Clause
Congress has repeatedly used the Spending Clause to encourage
states to adopt certain legislation or policies.' 73 As an example, Congress
enacted the Swampbuster provision to encourage individual farmers to
preserve wetlands. The Seventh Circuit did not find that conditioning the
receipt of farm subsidies on preserving wetlands was impermissibly
coercive.174
The Supreme Court has stated that "in some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass
the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."" 75 Further, the Court
has stated that Congress may not condition the funds in such a way that
170 Id. at 929. It is also alleged that the USDA began proceedings against the Branstads because
they received a complaint from one of the Branstads' neighbors. Id.
171 Id. at 939-41. In Branstad, the farmer sought a preliminary injunction to stop the USDA from
terminating an extension of time to comply with a restoration agreement. Id. at 932. The Branstads
wanted to enjoin the enforcement of the agreement until after judicial review was completed. Id.
In determining whether a preliminary injunction was appropriate, the court had to decide the
likelihood of the Branstads succeeding on the merits of the case, although the court did not actually
pass a decision on the merits. Id. at 939.
.7, Id. at 940.
173 See Douglas, supra note 96, at 65.
174 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 476-77.
175 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (citing Steward Mach.Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
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the recipient has no alternative other than complying with the provision.1
Under the Swampbuster provisions, the farmer is faced with the decision
of either complying with the statute or going out of business. At the time
Congress passed the FSA, over 90% of agriculture producers relied on
farm subsidies.' 7 7  The FSA required farmers to "comply with
environmental conservation requirements in order to continue to be
eligible for government subsidies." 78  In the present case, the district
court, while not invalidating the statute, concluded that, "the Swampbuster
provisions are coercive; in fact, they give the USDA a big club with which
to protect wetlands."' 79
The Seventh Circuit briefly analyzed whether the Swampbuster
provision was overly coercive but shied away from invalidating the statute
on this ground.'80 However, many circuits have not been as reluctant to
accept this argument. In Bradley v. Arkansas Department ofEducation,'8 1
the state was required to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity for
claims that arose under the Rehabilitation Act if the state received federal
funds.182 In finding the statute to be a violation of the Spending Clause,
the court found that the conditions amounted to impermissible coercion.
Because the state had to renounce all funding, including funding unrelated
to the Rehabilitation Act, if it did not comply with the conditions, the state
was left with no choice but to comply. 8
Similarly, Horn had no choice but to comply with the FSA and the
176 Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999).
177 Rebecca Fink, "We're From the Government and We're Here to Help." Farmers'and
Ranchers' Reliance on Voluntary Governmental Programs May Open the Door to Governmental
Control of Private Property Through the Expanding Scope of Wetlands Regulation, 30 TEX. TECH.
L. REv. 1157, 1158 (1999).
178 Id. at 1159.
1' Horn Farms, Inc. v. Veneman, 319 F.Supp.2d. 902, 916 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
Iso Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 477.
"' 189 F.3d 745, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated, 197 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) and 235
F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
182 id
183 Id
'8 Id. The Eighth Circuit's decision was reversed on rehearing. See Jim C. v. United States, 235
F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that conditioning the receipt of federal funds on the
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity was not coercive because the state would only be
required to give up the funding related to education). For cases granting validity to the coercion
argument, see West Virginia v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 289 F.3d 281, 287-91 (4th
Cir. 2002); Commw. of Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569-71 (4th Cir. 1997).
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1996 amendment.'85 If Horn did not comply, the farm would lose 100%
of its subsidies.'8 Additionally, non-compliance rendered Horn ineligible
for all USDA programs.' 87 This meant that Horn was ineligible for all
farm programs such as loan assistance, price support payments, crop
insurance or disaster payments.' 88
The Seventh Circuit stated that Horn's rationale regarding the
Spending Clause was misplaced. The court stated that Horn could not rely
on Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole because it was not a governmental
body nor did it have any sovereignty that could be trampled upon.' 89
However, the court's view of this statement is not only too narrow, but it
fails to recognize the general applicability of the statement.
In Dole, Justice O'Connor reasoned that Congress' spending
power cannot be used in such a way that it coerces a state to surrender a
fundamental attribute of its sovereignty.190 The Seventh Circuit focused
on the literal meaning of this phrase. The court declared that this
viewpoint can only be applied to governmental bodies, which have
sovereignty that can be trampled. By only looking at the literal
interpretation, the court failed to recognize the applicability of O'Connor's
idea.
O'Connor explained that when Congress uses its spending power,
it cannot use the power to impose regulations.' 9' Congress can only use
its power to say how the money should be spent.192 This notion not only
applies to Congress when it uses its spending power to apportion money to
states; it is also applicable when the money is given to state agencies.193
Under the FSA, Congress is giving money to the farm agencies so they
can provide farmers with their subsidy benefits. Under O'Connor's
theory, Congress can say that the money can be spent on subsidies, but
185 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 22, Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472 (7th Cir.
2005) (No. 04-2948). Brief is located at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/briefs.htm (type 04-2948 in
year and docket number).
1 See id
117 See id
188 See Douglas, supra note 93, at n.2.
19 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 476-77.
'9 Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
''Id. at 216.
192 Id.
1 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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Congress cannot condition the receipt of such subsidies on maintaining
wetlands, because that goes beyond specifying how the money should be
spent.
The Seventh Circuit also upheld Congress' authority to condition
subsidies on a farmer's maintenance of wetlands under the test set out in
Dole.194 In Dole, the Supreme Court stated that Congress' spending
power was not unlimited.195 When Congress uses its spending power, the
conditions on the expenditure (i) must "be in pursuit of the general
welfare," (ii) it must condition the use of funds unambiguously, and (iii) it
must relate to a legitimate federal interest.196
The Seventh Circuit found that the FSA met all three conditions.' 9 7
The court stated that the preservation of wetlands met provisions (i) and
(iii).198 The court then addressed whether the statute was ambiguous
under the second provision. The court found that, "the statute is as clear
as can be."l 99 However, the court gave no reasons for why the statute was
clear, especially when the interpretation of the statutory language was the
main contention in the case. The Supreme Court has previously stated that
a statute is ambiguous if a person cannot ascertain what is expected of him
or unable to ascertain what is expected of him. 2 00 The provisions of the
FSA do not allow a farmer to ascertain what is expected of him. He
cannot determine if he is allowed to reconvert his land because of the
statement "that date." Because of this, a farmer cannot know if he is
complying with the provision of the statute.
The Seventh Circuit should have recognized that the wetlands
provision of the FSA leaves farmers with no choice but to comply with the
provision. If a farmer does not comply, he becomes 100% ineligible for
subsides. This leaves the farmer with a choice of complying or potentially
going out of business. Additionally, provisions that are ambiguous do not
allow the farmer to truly ascertain what he has to do in order to comply.
Therefore, one small mistake and he loses all subsidies. Such a provision
1 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 477.
'95 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
"6 Id. at 207-08.
197 Horn Farms, 397 F.3d at 477.
19 Id.
2h Id S200 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldentnan, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
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cannot be found to be a valid exercise of Congress' spending power.
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Horn Farms is disheartening
because it leaves farmers with few viable options for reconversion of a
wetland. The statute clearly states that a farmer can reconvert a wetland if
the land returned to wetland status as a result of lack of maintenance of a
drainage system.201 Under this provision, Horn Farms reconverted the
wetland to farmland. Since the statute was ambiguous, he lost all of his
subsidies. Since the statute is premised on 100% compliance, the statute is
too coercive to fall within Congress' spending power. The Seventh
Circuit ignored these challenges and overlooked the ambiguities, instead
of capitalizing on them and granting farmers the leniency they deserve.
AMY L. OHNEMUS
191
201 See 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b).
